Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II

The author observes that the three pillars of Basel II seem uneven: Pillars 1 and 2 have eclipsed Pillar 3 - market discipline and disclosure - in the Basle Committee's deliberations. He works through a banking model of the three Pillars, shows how the optimal liquidation limit varies with bank liability structure and the regulatory regime, and argues that market discipline, via mandatory subordinated debt issuance, can reduce forbearance by supervisors.Bank supervision ; Bank capital ; Banking law

Prudential Policy

This paper studies the rationale behind prudential policies in the banking sector. The main components of these prudential policies are deposit insurance, solvency regulations, and emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank, acting as a lender of last resort. We discuss the institutional arrangements that are necessary to limit the frequency and extent of individual bank failures as well as those of systemic banking crises.

Must-Take Cards: Merchant Discounts and Avoided Costs

Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts. The paper attempts to shed light on this “must-take cards” view from two angles. First, the paper gives some operational content to the notion of “must-take card” through the “avoided-cost test” or “tourist test”: would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non-repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register? It analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees. Second, it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems’ determination of interchange fees: internalization by merchants of a fraction of cardholder surplus, issuers’ per-transaction markup, merchant heterogeneity, and extent of cardholder multi-homing. It compares the industry and social optima both in the short term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability)

The interchange fee mysteries : commentary on Evans and Schmalensee

Debit cards ; Credit cards

Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation

Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world’s leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? , he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.banking crises, bank regulation, deposit insurance, globalization